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Over the last decade or so, a great deal of important scholarship 
has found positive associations between better corporate governance 
and firm market value, firm performance, stock market development, 
and economic growth.1  In light of these findings, it is not surprising 
that scholars have focused considerable attention on trying to develop 
methods of assessing whether a firm has good governance.2  However, 
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1 See Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Go-
vernance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 786 (2009) (finding that certain provisions en-
trenching managers appear to also negatively influence firm valuation and stockholder 
returns); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. 
Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1139 (1997) (finding that 
“the results on debt, like those on equity, suggest that legal rules influence external 
finance”); Ross Levine, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth, 8 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 8, 
24 (1999) (“[T]he legal and regulatory environment materially affect financial inter-
mediary development.”); Dhammika Dharmapala & Vikramaditya Khanna, Corporate 
Governance, Enforcement, and Firm Value:  Evidence from India 1 (Univ. of Mich. Law & 
Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 08-005, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1105732 (presenting a “strong case for a causal effect of [corporate gover-
nance] reforms on firm value”). 
2 See Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberto Romano, The Promise and Peril of Cor-
porate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1807 (2008) (“Today, a market for 
corporate governance ratings exists . . . .”); Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio 
Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. 
ECON. 430, 432-33 (2008) (discussing the Anti-Self-Dealing Index); Rafael La Porta, 
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 
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developing governance standards that apply to all firms has not been 
easy, as there are important differences among firms (and countries) 
that tend to undermine such efforts.  In The Elusive Quest for Global Go-
vernance Standards, Professors Bebchuk and Hamdani address this is-
sue and provide an analytical framework that leads to the develop-
ment of two standards for assessing good corporate governance that 
have applicability across many firms and countries. 
In this response, I examine Bebchuk and Hamdani’s analysis and 
explore how one might implement parts of it.  In the process, I rely on 
some of the experiences of other countries—especially emerging 
markets such as India, Korea, Russia and Brazil—to enrich the discus-
sion and aid our understanding.  Part I briefly summarizes Bebchuk 
and Hamdani’s analysis.  Part II discusses their analysis and examines 
potential critiques.  It concludes that these critiques do not weaken 
Bebchuk and Hamdani’s recommendations and discusses why their 
recommendations are both valuable and well-balanced.  Finally, Part 
III concludes with some thoughts on how to begin to implement Beb-
chuk and Hamdani’s recommendations.3 
I.  BEBCHUK AND HAMDANI–-MORE THAN ONE STANDARD  
FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE 
Most corporate governance rankings and indices provide a uni-
form scale for assessing a firm’s governance.  In other words, the in-
dices use the same factors to compute the governance scores of firms 
regardless of differences in firm characteristics (e.g., ownership struc-
ture, size, or industry) or countries.4  This has the advantage of pro-
ducing a single number for each firm against which other firms can be 
compared in order to get a sense of relative governance quality.  
However, Bebchuk and Hamdani argue that such a single score may 
 
J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1126-28 (1998) (discussing the Antidirector Rights Index); Robert 
Daines, Ian Gow & David Larcker, Rating the Ratings:  How Good Are Commercial Gover-
nance Ratings? 8-14 (Stanford Univ. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 360, 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1152093 (examining governance ratings from 
three rating firms). 
3 The analysis focuses only on the issue of developing governance ratings that cap-
ture which firms have “better” governance and does not discuss whether better gover-
nance causes changes in firm market value or whether common law jurisdictions have 
better governance rules than civil law jurisdictions. 
4 See generally Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang & Woochan Kim, Does Corporate Go-
vernance Predict Firms’ Market Values? Evidence from Korea, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 366 
(2006); Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 2; La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 2. 
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lead to mischaracterization and misranking of firms’ governance prac-
tices.5 
This is because what may be considered the best governance for a 
particular firm may not necessarily be the best for a differently si-
tuated firm.6  Optimal governance is generally not one-size-fits-all and 
hence, a uniform scoring standard could lead to misranking.7  Indeed, 
other studies have raised serious doubts about the value of uniform 
corporate governance rankings.8 
However, if optimal governance is largely endogenous to other 
firm characteristics (and other governance practices), then one won-
ders whether there is much value in having governance rankings.  Af-
ter all, if the best governance for a firm “depends” on so many other 
things, then what is the point of having a ranking system that says that 
governance practice “X” is better than practice “Y” for all firms? 
Bebchuk and Hamdani take these insights and develop a middle 
ground that recognizes that while optimal governance does vary, the 
 
5 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Stan-
dards, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1281-1304 (2009). 
6 See N. Balasubramanian, Bernard S. Black & Vikramaditya Khanna, Firm-Level 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets:  A Case Study of India 3 (European Corporate 
Governance Inst., Law Working Paper 119/2009, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=992529 (“Our findings . . . suggest that the benefits of particular corporate 
governance practices vary depending on firm and country characteristics.”); Sridhar R. 
Arcot & Valentina G. Bruno, One Size Does Not Fit All, After All:  Evidence from Cor-
porate Governance 2 (Jan. 15, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=887947 (“[W]hen looking at various governance criteria, it 
may be realistic that in many cases deviating from a principle is optimal.”). 
7 See Protecting Shareholders and Enhancing Public Confidence by Improving Corporate 
Governance:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Profes-
sor John C. Coates IV, John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard 
Law School), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction 
=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=c754606c-0b95-4139-a38a-63e63b4b3fa9& 
Witness_ID=49f23bdb-ae69-42a8-a6d5-82d7fb82502a (proposing solutions to solve col-
lective-action problems among shareholders while avoiding “forcing a one-sized-fits-all 
solution on companies generally”); Balasubramanian, Black & Khanna, supra note 6, at 
3 (arguing that governance is not one-size-fits-all); Arcot & Bruno, supra note 6, at 2 
(“[I]n matters of corporate governance, one-size-does-not-fit-all.”).  Uniform scoring sys-
tems (such as the Body Mass Index (BMI)) can have unusual results.  See Dan Mindus, 
Tom Cruise:  Hottie or Fatty?, CENTER FOR CONSUMER FREEDOM, Dec. 25, 2003, http:// 
www.consumerfreedom.com/oped_detail.cfm?oped=160 (“A BMI of 30 or more makes 
you obese, and at 5-7, 201 pounds, Tom Cruise has a BMI of 31. . . . Michael Jordan (6-
6, 216 pounds, BMI of 25) . . . [was] also ‘overweight’ at the height of [his] athletic 
powers.”). 
8 See Bhagat, Bolton & Romano, supra note 2, at 1808 (arguing that the “most ef-
fective governance institution depends on context and on firms’ specific circums-
tances”); Daines, Gow & Larcker, supra note 2, at 4 (finding that even the best ratings 
systems have fairly unimpressive predictive validity). 
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primary areas of variation can be narrowed so that ranking systems re-
tain some usefulness.  The middle ground that they develop is not on-
ly theoretically justifiable but also one that can be implemented.  
Their approach divides firms into two categories—those that have a 
controlling shareholder (CS firms) and those that do not (NCS 
firms).  Usually, scholars characterize the United States and the Unit-
ed Kingdom as having more NCS firms and most other countries as 
having primarily CS firms.9  This division by ownership structure is 
theoretically important because the kinds of investor-protection (cor-
porate governance) problems in these two types of firms are differ-
ent.10 
At NCS firms, there is no controlling shareholder, so de facto con-
trol tends to rest with management.11  Thus, investors (shareholders) 
are most concerned with what management is doing, and hence the 
focus is on the manager-shareholder relationship.12  In CS firms, there 
is a controlling shareholder and hence de facto control rests with the 
controller, not management.  Thus, investors are most concerned with 
what the controlling shareholder does, and hence the focus is on the 
controlling (majority) shareholder–minority shareholder relation-
ship.13  While there is some overlap in these kinds of concerns, there 
are also important differences.  For example, antitakeover defenses 
are important in NCS firms but of limited importance in CS firms be-
cause control is not contestable.14  However, rules regulating freezeout 
transactions matter more in CS firms than NCS firms.15  These differ-
 
9 Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1267 & n.9, 1268. 
10 See John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What Is Corporate 
Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW:  A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL AP-
PROACH 31 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009) (“[T]he structure of corporate 
law in any given country is in important part a consequence of that country’s particular 
pattern of corporate ownership . . . .”); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Control-
ling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 785 (2003) (“The presence of a con-
trolling shareholder reduces the managerial agency problem, but at the cost of the 
private benefits agency problem.”). 
11 Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1281-82. 
12 See id. at 1281 (“Because management’s interests may diverge from those of 
shareholders, [the prime concern is addressing] management’s potential to behave 
opportunistically at the expense of shareholders.”). 
13 See id. at 1282 (“Controllers . . . may . . . have interests that do not overlap with 
those of outside investors . . . . In CS companies, therefore, the fundamental con-
cern . . . is the controlling shareholder’s opportunism.”). 
14 Id. at 1285-89. 
15 Id. at 1304-06, 1310. 
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ences lead to different metrics for what is considered good gover-
nance in these firms. 
Bebchuk and Hamdani then provide a list of which governance 
practices matter most in CS firms and, separately, in NCS firms. 16  
They use this to develop two types of governance scores–-one for CS 
firms and another for NCS firms.  A summary is provided in Table 1. 
 
Table 1:  Summary of Bebchuk and Hamdani’s Recommendations 
 
Areas of Interest 
Factors Relevant in  
NCS Firms 
Factors Relevant in  
CS Firms 
Control Contests Rules on hostile takeovers 
and proxy fights. 
Rules not critical in CS 
firms. 
Shareholder Voting 
Procedures 
Rules facilitating voting by 
majority shareholders:  (i) 
vote by mail or proxy; (ii) 
vote without deposit 
shares; (iii) who can place 
proposals for vote; and 
(iv) confidential voting. 
Rules not critical in CS 
firms.  
Power Between Board 
and Shareholders 
Rules on which gover-
nance changes sharehold-
ers may initiate. 
Rules not as critical as in 
NCS firms. 
Executive Compensa-
tion (NCS) and Self 
Dealing and Freezeouts 
(more CS firms) 
Rules on substantive and 
procedural aspects of 
compensation and rules 
on shareholder ratifica-
tion. 
Rules on disclosure, vot-
ing requirements, and 
fiduciary duties govern-
ing self-dealing and free-
zeouts.  These rules mat-
ter more in CS firms. 
Power Between Majori-
ty and Minority  
Rules not critical in NCS 
firms. 
Rules on veto rights, re-
lated-party transactions 
(RPTs), and cumulative 
voting.  
Director Independence Rules examining ties be-
tween directors and man-
agement. 
Rules examining ties be-
tween directors and con-
troller.  Rules on nomi-
nation and selection 
process and whether in-
fluenced by controllers. 
 
16 Id. at 1306-16. 
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Areas of Interest 
Factors Relevant in  
NCS Firms 
Factors Relevant in  
CS Firms 
Controlling Minority 
Shareholders 
Rules not critical in NCS 
firms.  
Rules related to separat-
ing voting and cash-flow 
rights.    
Evaluating Legal Sys-
tems 
Country score for these 
types of firms. 
Country score for these 
types of firms (different 
than for NCS firms).  
II.  DISCUSSION OF BEBCHUK AND HAMDANI’S FINDINGS 
The Bebchuk and Hamdani approach has much to commend it—
it provides a theoretically justifiable reason for having different gover-
nance scores for CS and NCS firms, thereby increasing the usefulness 
of the rankings.  However, it still limits the number of governance 
scores to two kinds (CS and NCS) so that scholars and rating firms 
may construct governance rankings without great complication.  This 
approach is desirable if the differences between CS and NCS firms are 
as Bebchuk and Hamdani describe and if the other factors that may 
influence good governance are not as important as the effect on go-
vernance of differences in ownership structures. 
A.  Differences Between Controlling and Non-Controlling Shareholder Firms 
The differences between CS and NCS firms that Bebchuk and 
Hamdani identify find considerable support in the extant literature.  
At an anecdotal level, the types of fraud that typify CS firms and NCS 
firms tend to be somewhat different.  For example, frauds like those 
that took place at Enron and Worldcom (United States) are more 
common in NCS firms, whereas the types of fraud seen at Parmalat 
(Italy) and Satyam (India) are more common in CS firms.17  One of 
the key differences between the two categories of fraud is that the 
NCS fraud tends to involve management misrepresenting perfor-
mance to cover up poor performance or to obtain benefits from ex-
 
17 See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 10; Vikramaditya Khanna, Corporate Governance 
in India:  Past, Present & Future?, 1 JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manu-
script at 17-22, on file with author) (contrasting the frauds in the United States (e.g., 
Enron) and India (e.g., Satyam)); John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corporate Scandals: 
Why the U.S. and Europe Differ 2 (Columbia Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper 
No. 274, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=694581 (“[D]ifferences in the 
structure of share ownership account for [important] differences in corporate scan-
dals . . . .”). 
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ecutive compensation, whereas CS fraud tends to involve controllers 
covering up expropriation of corporate funds or opportunities.18  This 
suggests that the measures (and governance practices) that would be 
useful for deterring the two kinds of frauds are likely to be somewhat 
different. 
Within the empirical literature, studies have found that the level 
of management entrenchment is important for assessing governance 
at NCS firms.19  This would not be a significant issue in CS firms in 
most jurisdictions because the controller can easily replace managers. 
However, some empirical studies in emerging markets provide in-
triguing results.  Studies on the adoption of governance reforms in 
Russia, Korea, and India, among others, find that governance reforms 
are well received by the stock markets and, indeed, better governance 
is often associated with increases in firm market value.20  The puzzle is 
that these reforms are almost uniformly the “better governance” pre-
scriptions that would be relevant for NCS firms even though most 
firms in these countries are CS firms.  This fact appears to suggest that 
the differences in CS and NCS firms do not translate into a need for 
different governance rules or ranking systems. 
However, this interpretation may be hasty.  First, many countries 
with predominantly CS firms may have had ineffective governance re-
gimes initially.  In such countries, any enhancement of governance 
(even if not perfectly tied to CS firms’ concerns) would be an im-
provement over the status quo and would generate positive results.21  
Further, the signal sent by state-enacted governance reforms may be at 
 
18 See Khanna, supra note 17; Coffee, supra note 17, at 15 (“The U.S./U.K. system 
of dispersed ownership is vulnerable to gatekeepers not detecting inflated earnings, 
and concentrated ownership systems fail to the extent that gatekeepers miss (or at least 
fail to report) the expropriation of private benefits.”). 
19 See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Power-
ful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards:  Theory, Evidence and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 
939 (2002) (deeming staggered boards “by far the most important takeover defense 
mechanism in the market for corporate control”); Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra 
note 1, at 823 (identifying a correlation between entrenching provisions and lower 
firm valuation). 
20 See Bernard S. Black, Inessa Love & Andrei Rachinsky, Corporate Governance Indic-
es and Firms’ Market Values:  Time Series Evidence from Russia, 7 EMERGING MARKETS REV. 
361, 378-79 (2006) (Russia); Black, Jang & Kim, supra note 4, at 410-11 (Korea); Bala-
subramanian, Black & Khanna, supra note 6, at 37 (India). 
21 Bernard S. Black and Vikramaditya Khanna have made a similar point.  See Ber-
nard S. Black & Vikramaditya Khanna, Can Corporate Governance Reforms Increase Firm 
Market Values?  Event Study Evidence from India, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 749, 788 
(2007) (“[T]he same reforms could have net benefits in a poor governance country, 
such as India prior to [corporate governance reforms], yet net costs for companies that 
are already well governed, such as the United States.”). 
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least as important as the reforms themselves.22  The market would re-
ceive positively the signal that the government is friendlier to investor 
interests and that governance matters.  Moreover, it may be that the 
response would have been even more positive had the reforms actual-
ly targeted the primary concerns of CS firms.  Finally, all of these ac-
counts seem to suggest that at least some of the NCS governance 
changes may help to alleviate some governance concerns at CS firms.  
This is both true and still consistent with the Bebchuk and Hamdani 
analysis.  Their analysis does not suggest that there is no overlap in 
governance concerns but rather that there are specific governance 
concerns at CS (NCS) firms that should be addressed and assessed dif-
ferently than at NCS (CS) firms.23 
B.  Other Governance Factors Besides Ownership Structure 
The above analysis suggests that delineating governance practices 
between CS and NCS firms is an important step in making governance 
rankings more useful.  However, for this approach to be most useful, 
other factors (e.g., firm characteristics) must have a lesser influence 
on optimal governance when compared to ownership structure.  
These other factors can be divided roughly into those related to the 
country where the firm is located (e.g., political stability, whether the 
state has a “grabbing hand,”24 labor-friendly laws, tax laws, and law en-
forcement) and to firm characteristics (e.g., firm size and industry). 
 
22 See Vikramaditya Khanna, Law Enforcement and Stock Market Development:  Evidence 
from India 27-29 (Ctr. on Democracy, Dev. & Rule of Law, Working Paper No. 97, 
2009), available at http://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/law_enforcement_and_ 
stock_market_development_evidence_from_india (discussing one way in which a state-
enacted reform could send a signal); Robert N. Eberhart, Corporate Governance Sys-
tems and Firm Value:  Empirical Evidence for the Value of Transparency 20 (May 
2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://aparc.stanford.edu/publications/ 
corporate_governance_systems_and_firm_value_empirical_evidence_for_the_value_ 
of_transparency (“[T]he signaling provided by adoption of a system including outsid-
ers promising a more transparent system does indeed operate to give Japanese firms a 
plausible and beneficial reason to adopt the iinkai system.”). 
23 Bebchuk and Hamdani also suggest that, for countries with many CS firms, it 
may be easier politically to adopt reforms targeted at the concerns raised by NCS firms.  
Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1316. 
24 See Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Scylla or Charybdis?  Historical Reflections on Two Basic 
Problems of Corporate Governance, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 9, 13-16 (2009) (discussing concerns 
with “grabbing hand” states and how certain institutional arrangements may have re-
duced this behavior); Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Cor-
porate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539, 560 (2000) (“American corporate law is made in 
contexts (such as in Delaware’s legislature and courts) where labor’s influence is indi-
rect and weak.”). 
2009] Corporate Governance Ratings 47 
First, consider the country factors.  It would appear that whether a 
state has labor-friendly laws or is a “grabbing hand” (i.e., expropriates 
firm assets) will be factors that are relevant to governance.25  Would 
these factors suggest different optimal governance for firms in states 
without these attributes as compared to firms in states with these 
attributes?  One can imagine that less disclosure might be desirable 
for firms in “grabbing hand” states because enhanced disclosure 
might attract the state’s attention and lead the state to expropriate 
firm assets.  In such states, corporations might prefer alternate means 
of protecting shareholders from managers or controllers, rather than 
relying on enhanced disclosure.  Similarly, in countries with weak en-
forcement, the validity of important corporate decisions might de-
pend less on ex post judicial adjudication and more on “self-
enforcing” measures, such as requirements for shareholder approval.26 
Would these differences lead us to create different ranking sys-
tems for firms in “grabbing hand” states (or weak-enforcement states) 
and for firms that are not?  Although such a result is certainly plausi-
ble, there are a few reasons that one might not create separate rank-
ing systems.  First, some of these factors are likely to be caught in Beb-
chuk and Hamdani’s country-specific governance ratings.  Second, CS 
structures often exist in countries that possess labor-friendly laws, use 
certain tax laws, or enforce their laws weakly.27  Whether CS structures 
led to these laws or vice versa is not as important as the high degree of 
correlation between these factors.  If so, then perhaps in calculating 
scores for CS firms we can include these factors as they are more likely 
to be present for such firms.  Finally, the differences in governance 
that these factors trigger may relate to only one (or a few) governance 
practice(s) so that creating a separate ranking system may not be 
 
25 See Lamoreaux, supra note 24, at 9 (“[T]he more successful investors are in pro-
tecting their capital from the grabbing hand of the state, the less they are able to call 
upon the state to protect it from the grabbing hand of corporate insiders.”). 
26 See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 
109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1932 (1996) (“The self-enforcing model minimizes the need 
to rely on courts and administrative agencies for enforcement.  Thus, it is robust even 
when these resources are weak.”). 
27 See Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities 
Laws:  Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON.  207, 226-37 (2009) (examining the im-
portance of enforcement to financial outcomes, ownership structure, and corporate 
governance); Roe, supra note 24, at 547-60 (discussing how political ideologies (e.g., 
social democracies and labor policies) influence corporate governance and ownership 
concentration); Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Taxation and Corporate 
Governance:  An Economic Approach 11-13, 15-16 (Apr. 2007) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=983563 (exploring connections between 
ownership structure and tax and corporate governance and tax). 
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worth the effort.28  In comparison, the differences in optimal gover-
nance between CS firms and NCS firms are likely to be greater and to 
capture more of the likely differences in optimal governance.  Thus, 
having different governance scores for CS firms and NCS firms may be 
desirable. 
Other firm-specific factors may influence optimal governance 
practices.  Studies have shown that both industry and firm size can in-
fluence optimal governance.29  For example, it may be optimal for 
larger firms to have more detailed procedures and disclosures than 
smaller firms both because larger firms may have more agents to mon-
itor and because they may be better able to bear the costs.  Similarly, 
characteristics of an industry, such as the extent to which an industry 
depends on external capital, may alter optimal corporate governance. 
Moreover, within CS firms, studies show that the same governance 
feature appears to have different effects in different contexts.30  These 
studies provide mixed results on something as ubiquitous as board in-
dependence.  Studies on Korea find that board independence is asso-
ciated with higher firm market value, studies on India find that this 
relationship is either weaker or nonexistent, and studies on Brazil find 
no relationship or a negative relationship between board indepen-
dence and market value (i.e., board independence is associated with 
lower firm market value).31  All of these countries have CS firms pri-
 
28 One could argue that these country-specific issues are not corporate laws and 
should not be part of corporate governance rankings.  However, if firms adjust their 
governance to respond to the country-specific issues, then the issues may be significant 
enough for corporate governance rankings to account for them.  Further, if these ad-
justments affect variables of interest (such as firm performance, firm market value, or 
stock market development), then the rankings should reflect the adjustments because 
the rankings are often used to assess whether governance practices correlate with the 
variables of interest, such as better firm performance. 
29 See Balasubramanian, Black & Khanna, supra note 6, at 29-30 (including firm 
size and industry as variables); Art Durnev & E. Han Kim, To Steal or Not to Steal:  Firm 
Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation, 60 J. FIN. 1461, 1474 (2005) (using industry 
dummies and firm size in regressions to assess the impact of corporate governance on 
firm value); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 
AM. ECON. REV. 559, 566-67 tbl.1 (1998) (analyzing data by industry). 
30 NCS firms in the United Kingdom show similar results.  See Arcot & Bruno, su-
pra note 6, at 26 (“[C]ompanies that depart from best practice because of genuine cir-
cumstances outperform all others.”). 
31 See Black, Jang & Kim, supra note 4, at 411 (Korea); Balasubramanian, Black & 
Khanna, supra note 6, at 32-33 (India); Bernard S. Black, Antonio Gledson de Carvalho 
& Erica Gorga, Does One Size Fit All in Corporate Governance?  Evidence from Brazil 24-25 
(Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper No. 09-20, 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434116 (Brazil). 
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marily.32  The divergence in findings is difficult to reconcile unless we 
bring into the mix the notion that the same governance features may 
have different effects on firm market value depending on the sur-
rounding context or institutional framework.  This suggests that there 
are other firm- or country-specific factors besides ownership structure 
that influence optimal governance.33 
If we were to account for all these differences by devising a multi-
tude of ranking systems, then the overall process of performing cor-
porate governance rankings would carry a heavy burden.  However, 
there are reasons not to account for all of these differences but to 
have two ranking systems divided by ownership structure.  First, the 
other firm characteristics may lead to only a few differences in optimal 
governance, whereas differences in ownership structure may lead to 
more differences between assessments of CS and NCS firms, thereby 
justifying two separate ranking systems.  Second, these other characte-
ristics are factors that can be used to create subsidiary rankings.  It is 
fairly common in many ranking systems to have one or two features 
that create the main ranking systems while allowing for the develop-
ment of subsidiary systems to account for more specialized interests.  
For example, Zagat’s restaurant guide provides general rankings in 
certain cities and also more finely tuned rankings based on other fac-
tors (e.g., type of cuisine).34 
 
32 See Tarun Khanna & Yishay Yafeh, Business Groups in Emerging Markets:  Paragons 
or Parasites?, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 331 (2007) (detailing how ownership structures 
vary throughout emerging markets); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & 
Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 491-93 (1999) (not-
ing that dispersed firms are seen primarily in the United States and the United King-
dom); Balasubramanian, Black & Khanna, supra note 6, at 18-19 (noting ownership 
structure in Indian firms); E. Han Kim & Woochan Kim, Corporate Governance in Korea:  
A Decade After the Financial Crisis (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 123, 
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1084066 (discussing governance in Korea 
and ownership structure); Erica Gorga, Changing the Paradigm of Stock Ownership:  
From Concentrated Towards Dispersed Ownership? Evidence from Brazil and Conse-
quences for Emerging Countries 18-21 (Sept. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121037 (discussing ownership structure in Brazil). 
33 Balasubramanian, Black & Khanna, supra note 6, at 32-34. 
34 Zagat, http://www.zagat.com/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2009).  Finally, there are 
firms between the NCS and CS extremes and different kinds of controllers (e.g., fami-
ly, government, or groups of blockholders), and some CS firms may have professional 
managers.  It is instructive to think of ownership structure as being more of a conti-
nuum rather than two extremes (CS and NCS).  However, for purposes of a ranking 
system, the two extremes are a good place to begin, and if the intermediate points 
seem to carry great weight, the system can be adjusted to reflect that.  Bebchuk & 
Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1271-72. 
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In the end, the overall decision about how many governance rank-
ing systems to have is also a matter of judgment.  Although one can 
make the case for using other governance metrics when creating go-
vernance ranking systems, the additional factors generally do not have 
as broad of an impact on optimal governance practices as ownership 
structure.  In light of this, Bebchuk and Hamdani’s recommendations 
to focus on ownership structure as the critical dividing line seems ju-
dicious and balanced. 
III.  CONCLUSION AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Bebchuk and Hamdani have presented an insightful discussion of 
corporate governance ranking systems and developed a two-tier rank-
ing system that is both theoretically justifiable and well-balanced.  In 
this last Part, I briefly discuss some options one might consider when 
beginning to implement their recommendations. 
Although one could explore many areas of governance, I limit my 
discussion to how one might operationalize the concept of indepen-
dent directors in CS firms.  As Bebchuk and Hamdani note, the key 
issue in NCS firms is whether the board is independent from man-
agement and, in CS firms, whether the board is independent from the 
controller.  However, because boards are generally elected by majority 
vote, the controller selects the board members in CS firms.  This fact 
raises questions about the independence of the board from the entity 
that voted it into office and underlines the importance of the nomi-
nation and selection processes.  Indeed, Bebchuk and Hamdani iden-
tify these processes as being important to assessing a CS firm’s gover-
nance rating.  If so, then what sorts of factors should we look to in 
assessing these processes? 
Emerging economies with many CS firms have tried different ways 
to enhance the chances that the selection of independent directors 
will ensure independence.  For example, after the Satyam scandal in 
India, commentators suggested having an independent nominating 
committee for the board.35  In Korea, a rule was utilized that reduces 
the controller’s voting stake in voting for members of the audit com-
mittee (who are automatically board members in Korea).  Thus, a 
controller’s stake drops to carrying only three percent of the vote for 
selecting audit committee members.36  Yet other countries maintain a 
 
35 Khanna, supra note 17, 17-22. 
36 For reference, see § 409 and § 542-12 of the Korean Commercial Code. 
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dual-board structure that works to constrain the controller’s influence 
in a different manner.37  When examining the independence of the 
board in CS firms, one might need to look for these kinds of rules and 
provisions to obtain a better sense of whether the directors are truly 
independent from the controller.  Thus, in order to implement the 
recommendations from Bebchuk and Hamdani, one must begin to 
explore in greater detail local laws and practices. 
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